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05/02/03
The
US's justification for the first Gulf war does not bear scrutiny
Maggie
O'Kane
The
Guardian
In 1990 as the US prepared for its first war
with Iraq there was heavy reliance on the use of "classified"
satellite photographs purporting to show that in September 1990 - a month after
the invasion of Kuwait - 265,000 Iraqi soldiers and 1,500 tanks were massing on
the border to gear up to invade Saudi Arabia. The threat of Saddam aggressively
expanding his empire to Saudi Arabia was crucial to the decision to go to war,
but the satellite pictures were never made public.
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2 1990. The US
cabinet met the same day. At that point, war was no more than a possibility.
Norman Schwarzkopf recalls the prevailing mood in his autobiography, It Doesn't
Take a Hero. He quotes General Colin Powell's remark to him: "I think we
could go to war if they invaded Saudi Arabia. I doubt if we would go to war over
Kuwait."
Within days the mood at the top had hardened.
When Schwarzkopf next met Powell, he was told to prepare to go to Saudi Arabia.
"I was stunned," he says in his book. "A lot must have happened
after I left Camp David that Powell wasn't talking about. President Bush had
made up his mind to send troops."
A lot had changed. By the early weeks of
September, America and Britain were leading the march towards war. Somehow,
almost without anybody noticing, the agenda was changing. Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait alone was no longer acceptable. New resolutions had been adopted by the
UN security council
The photographs, which are still classified in
the US (for security reasons, according to Brent Scowcroft, President Bush
senior's national security advisor), purportedly showed more than a quarter of a
million Iraqi troops massed on the Saudi border poised to pounce. Except, when a
resourceful Florida-based reporter at the St Petersburg Times persuaded her
newspaper to buy the same independently commissioned satellite photos from a
commercial satellite to verify the Pentagon's line, she saw no sign of a quarter
of a million troops or their tanks.
Jean Heller, an investigative reporter on the
St Petersburg Times, has been nominated for a Pulitzer prize five times and come
second twice, so when she asked permission to spend $3,200 (£1,950) on two
satellite pictures, the newspaper backed her.
Heller's curiosity had been aroused in
September when she read a report of a commercial satellite - the Soyuz Karta -
orbiting and taking pictures over Kuwait. She wanted to see what the only
independent pictures would make of the alleged massive build-up of Iraqi troops
on the Kuwait/Saudi border. Soyuz Karta agreed to provide them. But no trace of
the 265,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks that the US officials said were there
could be found in the photographs.
"The satellite pictures were so clear
that at Riyadh airport in Saudi Arabia you could see American planes sitting
wingtip to wingtip," Heller says.
She took the photographs for analysis to two
experts. "I looked at them with a colleague of mine and we both said
exactly the same thing at exactly the same moment: 'Where are they?'"
recalls Peter Zimmerman, a satellite expert at George Washington University.
'We could see clearly the main road leading
right through Kuwait, south to Saudi Arabia, but it was covered with sand banks
from the wind and it was clear that no army had moved over it. We could see
empty barracks where you would have expected these thousands of troops to be
billeted, but they were deserted as well."
Jean Heller wrote her story for the St
Petersburg Times. It opened with the words: "It's time to draft Agatha
Christie for duty in the Middle East. Call it, The Case of the Vanishing
Enemy."
Looking back now, Heller says: "If the
story had appeared in the New York Times or the Washington Post, all hell would
have broken loose. But here we are, a newspaper in Florida, the retirement
capital of the world, and what are we supposed to know?"
A year later, Powell would admit to getting
the numbers wrong. There was no massive build-up. But by then, the war had been
fought.
A public relations firm on a $2m contract from
the Kuwaiti government had been surreptitiously employed to make the case for
war. Hill & Knowlton's coup de grace was their fabricated "incubator
baby" story. A story of how Iraqi soldiers had thrown premature babies out
of incubators in the Al Adnan hospital in Kuwait city and "left them on the
cold floor to die".
Hill & Knowlton's work involved coaching
six witnesses to give the fake details of the attack on the premature baby unit.
The story was graphically told to Congress in November 1990 - before a crucial
vote - by Niyirah al Sabah who, unknown to her audience, was the daughter of the
Kuwaiti ambassador to the US. In her tearful testimony, she said she had
witnessed the Iraqi troops' brutality when she worked as a volunteer in the
maternity ward.
But Myra Ancog-Cooke, a Filipino nurse who
worked in the hospital, said that none of the staff there had ever heard of
Niyirah al Sabah; they had been present in the hospital throughout the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait and the story was untrue. A staunch Catholic, Ms Ancog-Cooke
explained that it was her duty and God's will that she stayed to care for the
sick. She was assigned to the children's ward and took it in turns with the
other Filipino nurse who stayed behind, Freida Contrais-Naig, to sleep in the
incubator room with the babies.
"I remember someone called and said,
'Look at CNN, they are talking about us." We watched and it was strange
seeing that girl telling them about the Iraqis taking the babies out of the
incubators. I said to Freida, 'That's funny, we've never seen her. She never
worked here.' We didn't think very much about it really. We were more excited
seeing our hospital on the television," she says.
Later, Amnesty International, who had also
been duped by the testimony, admitted it had got it wrong. Andrew Whitley of
Middle East Watch described it as a fabrication, but it took months for the
truth to come out. Meanwhile, President Bush mentioned the incubator babies in
five speeches and seven senators referred to them in speeches backing a pro-war
resolution.
Subsequently, Hill & Knowlton was
unabashed that the media worldwide, the UN security council and the US Congress
had been deceived by a 15-year-old girl who had been "trained" by a
public relations firm. Lauri Fitz-Pegado of Hill & Knowlton, who prepared
six witnesses to corroborate the incubator story to Congress, told John
Macarthur, author of The Second Front, a book on censorship in the Gulf war:
"Come on John, who gives a sh*t whether there were six babies or two. I
believed her."
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